

# Japanese Culture and Its Effects on the Post-Fukushima Anti-Nuclear Movement

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福島原発事故後の日本反核運動における日本文化の影響

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## Abstract

The purpose of my study is to assess through cultural analysis the level of political participation surrounding the anti-nuclear movement in Japan since the Fukushima Daiichi meltdown in 2011. To date, much of the discussion surrounding the anti-nuclear movement has taken a top-down approach or placed blame for the ultimate lack of results on an apathetic public without deeper analysis of Japanese culture and politics. I propose that, generally, any form of direct political opposition, especially life-disrupting protests, runs counter the overarching culture of cooperation and mutual support within Japan. The anti-nuclear movement while notable was an exception to the rule brought on by high emotions rather than an indicator of revolution. To gather data for my claim, I distributed a questionnaire inquiring about participants' attitudes on nuclear power, their rankings of top political issues, and their political participation (other than voting). Questions were divided into different time frames in order to show a progression of opinion and political activism from 2011 to today. The purpose of this questionnaire is to demonstrate a disjunction between public opinion and public action in Japan. Through research on the macro-level progression of the anti-nuclear movement I will also demonstrate that, although political activism was briefly stronger in Japan, even at its height the anti-nuclear movement lacked the momentum to sustain long-term opposition. Using cultural analysis, I argue that this lack of participation can be accounted for by cultural norms rather than a lack of knowledge or opinion in the general public.

## Introduction (概論)

The Fukushima Nuclear Disaster generated strong public opinions in Japan for nuclear energy, but did not lead to the political revolution some expected. It appeared in 2012 the anti-nuclear movement was the beginnings of a new political reality in Japan. However, even at the time there were signs the movement lacked the support it needed for sustained opposition. The spike in activism in 2011 and 2012 was brought on by high emotions, but once passions cooled the political culture reverted back to its previous state of inactivity. The level of passion required for even the temporary shift in political behavior carries important implications for how political activism should be viewed and discussed within Japan.

Immediately after the events in Fukushima, there was a strong feeling that Japanese politics was on the cusp of drastic change. In his book *3.11: Disaster and Change in Japan*, Richard J. Samuels conducted expansive research on the political results of the disaster. In the introduction of the work Samuels makes the resigned claim “We expect a lot of crises -- perhaps too much” (xii). Samuels states how he began his research with the expectation he would find the start of a new politics, but concludes “I note at the start that six months into my field research ... I became less certain of the imminence of large-scale change” (xiii). As time progresses from the disaster it is becoming increasingly clear to all that despite the rhetoric, March 11, 2011 was not the trigger for political revolution for which some had hoped. Anger after the disaster turned the public against nuclear power, but did not penetrate in a major way larger issues such as political inactivity, an unresponsive central government, or even long-term energy policy. There are several factors which contributed to this lack of change in the Japanese

political system, ranging from politically influential businesses, to insider politics, but one aspect which is especially relevant is the reaction of the Japanese populace.

To a Western observer the inability for the anti-nuclear movement to reach its overall aims may appear to be the result of a lack of emotional investment on behalf of the Japanese public. In August 2011 Dr. Daniel Aldrich expresses this viewpoint in an article for *The ParisTech Review* by stating that “few [Japanese] have been willing to expend the time and energy required to participate in public demonstrations or rallies.” To further his claim that it is a lack of public commitment which prevents large-scale energy change in Japan, Aldrich compares the “miniscule” 20,000 who protested in Tokyo in 2011 to the over 200,000 who protested in Germany as a direct result of the disaster. However, as will be proven in later cultural analysis, Aldrich’s comparison may be unfair. It is important to evaluate the cultural aspects of Japan which run counter mass public movements when comparing relative political investment. Due to a culture based on collective support, only the most highly-charged issues are capable of overcoming the inertia of traditional values. This does not reflect a failure of Japan, but rather an important cultural distinction. Despite the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement’s smallness and brevity when compared internationally, in the context of the greater cultural framework of Japan, it is an impressive accomplishment worth noting.

This paper will begin with a brief overview of the Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami as well as the meltdowns at the Fukushima Daiichi Power Station. This will be followed by a literature review of current works surrounding both nuclear power in politics since 2011 and analysis of Japanese culture. To begin the discussion of this paper, the methodology and basic results of this study’s questionnaire will be described. Finally,

the results of the survey, political activity surrounding nuclear power since the Fukushima Disaster, and general cultural analysis will be used to demonstrate the significance, but inevitable decline of the anti-nuclear movement.

### 背景 (Background)

2011年3月11日に日本の東北地方で9.0震度の地震がおこった (Samuels ix)。そして、津波が来て、二万人死んでしまった (Samuels ix)。大震災の上に、もう一つ災害があった。福島第一原子力発電所でメルトダウンが起こった。メルトダウンで十六万人立ち退かされた(Falk)。

1999年から2012年まで、原発は経済産業省 (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry) の原子力安全・保安院 (Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency)に管理されたが、経済産業省は原発の振興もした(Samuels 115)。利益相反なので、規制が厳しくなくて、原発が一番いい事故だけ準備した(Kingston “Tone-deaf”)。だから、福島第一は準備ができていなかった。福島第一原発は一度も避難訓練をして、安全改造に対運動した(Kingston ”Mismanaging Risk" 40,41)。

福島第一原子力発電所の事故の前に政治と原発会社は原発が絶対安全と言っていた(Oppenheim 92) 。だから、日本の人々は裏切られたと思った。世論調査によると福島第一原子力発電所事故をしたばかりの時、人口の半分以上は原発に賛成した(Samuels 130)。ところが、2012年3月に朝日新聞のアンケートによると、政治の新しい統制を信頼しない人は80パーセントであった (“Asahi poll: 80%”)。人々は怒ったので、たくさん学者は日本の政治は変えていると思った

(Samuels xii)。例えば、日本は 2012 年に 60 年代以来一番大きい抗議があった (Kingston “Mismanaging Risk” 55)。9 月 19 日に中央東京で六万人抗議に参加した (Avenell 271)。

騒動後に、2012 年に独立の原子力規制委員会が立てられた (Samuels 134)。利益相反を直し、新しい厳しい規制を作った (“Regulatory Requirements”)。しかし、日本人はそれに賛成しない。

法律で原子力発電所は 13 ヶ月停止することになった (Oppenheim 83)。それで、福島第一事故後の 14 ヶ月間には原子力発電所が稼働できなかった (Oppenheim 83)。原発がある町の市長と知事は停止した原発の再起動を止めた (Samuels 142)。

原子力稼働しなければ、電力不足という懸念があった。だから、2012 年 6 月に大飯発電所再起動した (Fackler)。怒った日本人はデモに東京へ来た (Fackler)。13 ヶ月後でもう一度止められた (Ogawa)。それから、再起動を止めた。2015 年 7 月まで、何も原発は再起動しなかった (Diggs)。その時九州の川内原子力発電所が稼働して始めた (Diggs)。新しいエネルギー計画と始めたので、将来に原発は続くそうです。

2012 年の夏に政府はエネルギー計画についてを三つの可能性を検討していた (Samuels 147)。それは 2030 年までに日本のエネルギーの中に原発の割合がゼロパーセント、15 パーセント、或は、25 パーセントになる (Samuels 147)。夏間会議ではゼロパーセントがほしい講演者の割合は 70 パーセントです (Samuels 147)。そして、政府は一般社会から論評を普通より 50 度以上もらった (Samuels 147)。

結局、15パーセントの選択にして、将来にゼロパーセントの目的を選んだ (Samuels 148)。これをすれば、原発が再起動して、2011年前の原発の整備計画をします (Samuels 148)。

最近原発はもう一回人々に注目された。2015年6月に新しいエネルギー計画が総合資源エネルギー調査会で通った (World Nuclear News)。この計画で日本のエネルギーに2030年までに原発が20パーセントから22パーセントまで占めるように予定する (World Nuclear News)。この数は2012年に検討した選択から来た (Oppenheim 95)。福島第一原子力発電所事故の前の計画に比べ、原発が20パーセント以上軽減することになった (Strategic Energy Plan of Japan 2010, World Nuclear News)。計画をできれば、40年も使用していた原子力発電所が60年まで使用しなければならなくて新しい (Kilisek)。「日本人も原発がほしいですか。」これをできれば、特別の許可がもらえなければならない (Kilisek)。

#### Literature Review (文献展望)

Despite how recent the Fukushima Daiichi Power Plant Disaster was it has prompted a vast array of literature on the event itself as well as the political fallout. All offer their own insights to the state of affairs at the time of the disaster and its effects; however certain themes run throughout the body of literature. These include criticism of the preparations taken by the nuclear industry as well as the central government. It is also often noted the increase in political activism after the Fukushima Disaster. The literature available is fundamental to understanding the political landscape of Japan and the anti-nuclear movement; however the focus of research thus far has been on the political

effects and predictions rather than a culture-focused view on the general political participation in Japan as it relates to the anti-nuclear movement.

In 2012 Yako Kawata, Robert Pekkanen, and Yutaka Tsujinaka contributed the article “Civil Society and the Triple Disaster: Revealed Strengths and Weaknesses” to the compilation *Nuclear Disaster and Nuclear Crisis in Japan*. Kawata, Pekkanen, and Tsujinaka’s article evaluates how the weaknesses in the civil society sector of Japan kept civic groups from exercising pressures on the nuclear power industry and politicians which might have helped hold disaster-preparedness measures more accountable. The authors draw special attention to the difficulties civil society groups face in accessing the politicians required to enact change (78). However, Kawata, Pekkanen, and Tsujinaka also note the increased strength of civil society groups after the Fukushima Disaster, as well as the key role they played in recovery for the effected regions (81, 87-89). The authors end by suggesting the civil society sector may begin to wield more influence in the aftermath of the disaster (93). While the focus of this paper is not civic organizations specifically, Kawata, Pekkanen, and Tsujinaka’s observations of the increased activity of these groups after the disaster is an indicator of the changes in behavior which occurred during the anti-nuclear movement.

To fully understand the context of the anti-nuclear movement, it is also important to understand the policies and actions of key actors before, during, and after the disaster. Jeff Kingston has been a prolific writer on the government failures which contributed to the severity of the disaster. Of special importance to this paper is the 2012 book *Nuclear Crisis in Japan: Response and Recovery after Japan's 3/11*, which Kingston edited. In Kingston’s article for the book, “The Politics of Natural Disaster, Nuclear Crisis and

Recovery," he describes the "nuclear village" of government officials, academics, and the nuclear power industry, and how this group presents a major barrier for effective policy changes (204). Kingston is critical of the central government's failure to respond to the anti-nuclear movement, given the movement's prevalence and intensity. In his 2014 article, "Mismanaging Risks and the Fukushima Nuclear Crisis" written for *Human Security and Japan's Triple Disaster: Responding to the 2011 Earthquake, Tsunami and Fukushima*, Kingston is even more critical. Kingston points out the many times the Fukushima plant owner, the Tokyo Electric Power Company, was aware of risks, but failed to adequately prepare. One important thing to be drawn from Kingston's writings is that the Japanese public faces challenges in its abilities to exert pressures on the central government. The political machinery of Japan puts grass-roots civic movements at a distinct disadvantage. This means even greater pressures must be applied on the central government to significantly influence policy and legislation. Paired with the cultural analysis explored later, Kingston's insights demonstrate just how unique the 2011 to 2012 anti-nuclear movement was. However, Kingston's focus on the political deafness of top officials does not provide a complete picture of the anti-nuclear movement. To fully understand the movement, the motivations and actions of the Japanese public should also be considered.

Richard J. Samuels' 2014 book, *3.11: Disaster and Change in Japan* is perhaps the most comprehensive body of literature on the Fukushima Disaster and its effects on Japanese society to date. The book aptly describes how various narratives were developed by relevant actors within Japan after the disaster in order to pursue their political aims. Samuels' account is instrumental in understanding how complex the

discussion surrounding the disaster was and is, and how these “dueling narratives” have affected how events manifested themselves (80). Samuels identifies two main narratives. The first focuses on revolutionizing Japan by replacing old structures and methods throughout society (187). The second focuses on continuing on the same path as before only better (187). Samuels challenges the notion that large shocks such as the Tōhoku Earthquake are required for large scale change, and asserts meaningful change can occur in the long-term incrementally (184). Later in this paper it will be addressed how the anti-nuclear movement was unable to obtain its main goal of phasing out nuclear energy. Samuels’ analysis shows that this short-term lack of major change does not mean there will be no change. Samuels’ detailed description of how events unfolded between the Fukushima Disaster and 2014 was also instrumental in developing the timeline of events for this paper.

While all of the aforementioned works are critical in understanding the Fukushima Disaster, in order for this study to take a cultural approach to analysis, key Japanese cultural traits need to be understood as well. There are of course a great number of books analyzing Japanese culture. Especially useful to this study was the book *The Japanese Mind* which targets students of Japanese cultural studies. The book highlights key characteristics of Japanese culture with an emphasis on how they contrast with Western, especially American, culture. The book introduces key concepts through specific words and terminology. Cultural aspects covered which are relevant to this paper include private versus public expressions of opinion, the emphasis of inside group members versus outside others, avoidance of direct opposition, and maintenance of group unity.

Finally, Patricia Steinhoff's article "Petitioning Officials: An Interaction Ritual of Protest in Japan" follows a similar approach to the analysis employed by this study. In 2008 Steinhoff observed three protests outside the Japanese Defense Ministry over the course of two days. From her observations, Steinhoff was able to draw some cultural conclusions regarding the purpose and practice of petitions in Japan. The key difference to the approach taken by Steinhoff and the approach of this study is Steinhoff focused her research on a specific case study. In contrast, this paper will utilize the larger event of the anti-nuclear movement to draw more generalized cultural conclusions.

### 方法論 (Methodology)

In order to better gauge what effect the Fukushima disaster may have had on the opinions and political activism of the average Japanese citizen, I created a survey to investigate normal Japanese citizens' opinions on nuclear power, their assessment of importance of nuclear power as a political issue, and what if any political actions they have taken since 2011.

このアンケートは日本に原発の重要度と日本人の原発について活動を説明してみた。日本人の知り合いと友達と以前教えてくれた先生にメールでアンケートと手紙を送った。「Appendix A」で全部アンケートが読める。手紙に他の知り合いにも送ってくれるようお願いしておいた。合計で16人へアンケートを送った。2週間インターネットでアンケートに参加可能だった。2週間後、46人がアンケートに答えた。

アンケートは3つの部分に別れていった。一番目は個人情報についてであった。次は原発の重要度についてであった。初めの質問は原発についての意見を

聞いた。それから、政治問題についてのランキングの質問があった。最後の部分は回答者がどんな政治の活動を行ったことがあるかという質問だった。原発以外のことについての質問なので、初めの質問は基本的なもので、次の質問は福島第一原子力発電所事故が発生した当時どんな政治の活動を行ったかについてで、最後の質問は最近政治の活動を行ったかということについてであった。


後で、政治の問題と比べるため、私は政治問題のランキングにポイントを与えた。1番目の問題には5ポイント、2番目のものには4ポイント、それ以下のランキングの問題にもポイントを与えた。選ばれなかった選択肢は0ポイントだった。あとで、ポイントの平均を出した。この数で選択肢でポイントが高い問題を比べた。「Appendix B Table 1.1-1.4」に結果がある。

### 結果 (Results)

アンケートの結果を見ると、回答者は男性15人、女性31人だった。16歳から25歳までの人は29人、26歳から30歳までの人は10人、31歳から40歳までの人は4人、41歳から50歳までの人は2人、51歳から60歳まで人は1人だった。「Table A」には性別と年齢の表がある。22人は東京都に住んでいる。埼玉県に住んでいる人は4人、神奈川と栃木県は二人ずつと答えた。北海道、宮城県、大阪府、京都府、青森、島根、滋賀県、静岡県は一人ずつ回答者がいた。そして、アメリカに住んでいる日本人が一人答えた。「Appendix C Table 2.1」は回答者が住んでいる都道府県の円グラフだ。

Table A: 回答者の性別と年齢 Respondents' Gender and Age						
性別 Gender	16歳~25歳	26歳~30歳	31歳~40歳	41歳~50歳	51歳~60歳	総計 Total
女性 Women	18	8	2	2	1	31
男性 Men	11	2	2			15
総計 Total	29	10	4	2	1	46

「Figure A」は回答者の原発の意見について示している。その結果は原発を使わない方がいい人は44%くらいをしめた。それに対して、使った方がいい人は26%以下だった。原発を使ったほうがいいかどうか分からない人は30%くらいだった。この調査で多数の日本人は原発に反対している



次に「Appendix B」に政治問題のランキングについての表がある。福島第一原子力発電所事故が発生した当時政治問題について質問で原発が一番の問題と思った回答者は76.1%だった。前述のランキング分析で平均は4.13だった。それに対して、憲法が一番の現代の政治問題と答えた人は26.1%だった。平均は2.3

だった。しかし、平均で一番の問題は国際関係で、2.54 だった。この結果から現代に日本人が重要であると考えられる問題は様々であることが分かる。

アンケートによると一般に政治の行動を行った人は少ないということが分かる。「Appendix D」には行った政治の行動についての図がある。リストから、回答者がどんな該当したことを選んだ。選択は「議会や役所に請願や陳情に行った」、「抗議をした」、「請願書に署名した」、「デモに参加した」、「その他」であった。一番あった行動は「請願書に署名した」が、3人から6人ぐらいであった。そして、回答者の中に行動を行った人は12人であった。それは4分の1ぐらいだ。行動を行わなかった人は4分の3ぐらいであった。1人だけデモに参加したが、原発以外デモであった。この結果から回答者は政治活動をあまり行わないということ分かる。だから、私は日本人がなぜ政治の行動をあまり行わず、またなぜ、全体的に日本の政治は2011年から2012年までの反核運動と違うかということの研究した。

The greatest limitation to my survey was the number of respondents. A result of forty-six respondents of different ages and coming from different regions is far from ideal. However, as I will demonstrate, my is in line with the data of other observations and studies. This suggests that my respondents are a fairly accurate representation of the average Japanese citizenry. I will still be cautious in my conclusions, relying only on those results which are supported by further outside research. My results should not be taken as quantitative evidence. Instead, I will utilize my results as anecdotal evidence for the larger trends that were observed by those who followed the anti-nuclear movement as it happens.

Additionally, but survey results contain a bias towards younger age groups. As the voting age in Japan is twenty, those in the sixteen to twenty-five age group would have been too young at the time of the Fukushima Disaster to have participated in much political activism. The fact this age group accounts for over sixty-three percent of my total sample is therefore likely to significantly skew the results of my study. Almost eighty-five percent of my respondents were between the ages of sixteen and thirty. However, while the data for 2011 through 2012 may be biased towards inactivity, all of my respondents would have been in a position to participate in some form of political activism in recent years. The fact there is still minimal participation is therefore noteworthy. This lack of participation also held true when examining those under twenty-five and those over twenty-five separately, though there is slightly more participation in the older age groups. Therefore, in my study there is no significant change across the time periods for any age group points in a lack of political participation overall.

#### Discussion (論議)

The first interesting result of this survey is the findings for support and opposition to nuclear power. Of the forty-six respondents, forty-four percent were against the use of nuclear power, twenty-six percent were in support of its use and thirty percent were uncertain. The fact the question was stated in the more forceful way of “Do you think nuclear power should be used?” rather than a more specific question such as “Do you think currently shut down reactors should be restarted?” could account for the large percentage of uncertainty. Additional uncertainty is likely to stem from the bias in my age group. Younger voters may be less likely to possess enough information to make a confident claim. Indeed, of the fourteen respondents who responded “I don’t know” only

two were outside of the sixteen to twenty-five age group, and these two respondents fell in the twenty-six to thirty age group. Taking into account the high “I don’t know” response rate, it is still clear that opposition is stronger than support for nuclear power.

My opinion findings are in line with repeated surveys since 2011. One of the biggest indicators that major changes were possible after March 11 was a sharp change in support of nuclear power. Several studies conducted in the year after the disaster found huge support for phasing out nuclear power. One particularly interesting study was conducted by the Japanese government and reported by *The Asahi Shimbun*. It found that roughly a third of those polled in July of 2012 via a phone interview supported a zero percent nuclear power option (“Support for nuke-free Japan”). Through a process termed “deliberative polling,” a group of these respondents were brought together in person to discuss nuclear policy options amongst each other and then report if their opinion had changed. When the respondents were brought together on August 4, 2012 support for a nuclear power-free Japan had already increased to roughly forty percent. After discussion this percentage raised to over forty-five percent (“Support for nuke-free Japan”). By comparison, the percentage of those choosing the twenty to twenty five percent nuclear power option remained almost constant at thirteen percent through the entirety of polling. This is in stark contrast to opinion polls conducted before the tragedy which found majority support for expanding nuclear power (Aldrich, Platte, and Sklarew). This shows that opposition only grew stronger when individuals were allowed to discuss policy options with each other.

An *Asahi Shimbun* poll conducted in the same month found forty-nine percent support for the zero-percent nuclear power option and eighty percent support for the

phasing out of nuclear power (“Asahi poll: 47% say nuclear power top issue”). Therefore, at the height of the anti-nuclear power movement, public opinion almost entirely turned against long-term use of nuclear power. It should be noted here that another *Asahi Shimbun* poll in 2012 found that fifty-seven percent opposed the restart of the Ōi nuclear reactors while twenty-seven percent were in favor (“Asahi poll: 80% distrust”). Therefore, it is clear that a strong opposition could be a factor in the political participation seen in 2012.

These numbers match a *Reuters* poll conducted in August of 2015, which found that fifty-seven percent opposed the restart of the Sendai plant while thirty percent were in favor (Sieg). These numbers almost exactly match the results of the 2012 *Asahi Shimbun* survey about the Ōi reactors. My survey’s results also come close to these numbers, though I found opposition to be less than these surveys. Regardless, this relatively stable level of public opinion indicates that the decline in open opposition to nuclear power is not because the public reverted to pre-Fukushima views. Opposition (and support) for nuclear power in the short term remains just as strong today as it was three years ago. No conclusion on why the anti-nuclear movement has lost momentum can therefore attribute the change to a shift in opinion. While opposition to nuclear power was of course the reason for anti-nuclear sentiments, the fact this opposition was acted upon must be contributed to other factors.

Despite relatively stable opposition, it can be seen that the priority of nuclear power has dropped in the past few years. Thirty-four of the forty-six respondents of my survey listed nuclear power as the number one political issue immediately after the Fukushima Daiichi Disaster. This shows that it was the largest and most relevant topic

during this time. My results may be slightly biased towards this outcome in my phrasing of the question directly drew images of the Fukushima disaster, however the overwhelming majority who listed nuclear power as their number one issue indicate it is safe to assume it was one of the top political issue at the time.

Furthermore, other contemporary sources also found nuclear power to be the driving political issue in 2011 and 2012. The same 2012 *Asahi Shimbun* poll which found fifty-seven percent opposition for nuclear power showed forty-seven percent of respondents would place “great importance” on the issue of nuclear power in the upcoming election, making it the third highest issue during that election season (“Asahi poll: 47% say nuclear power top issue”). This supports the conclusion reached by this paper’s questionnaire. Namely, that nuclear power was one of, if not the, key issue in 2011 through 2012. This heightened emphasis on nuclear power could therefore explain why those normally indisposed to protest might have in 2012.

Supporting the argument that it was a sense of urgency which prompted anti-nuclear activists is the fact that a drop in priority for nuclear power as a political issue mirrors the decline in the movement itself. According to the results of my investigation, this focus on nuclear power did not hold as time passed. After weighing each response according to the level or priority assigned it, my survey results show that nuclear power has fallen to fourth place in political priorities. It has been surpassed by international relations, the economy, and constitutional reform. Additionally it should be noted that none of these new top three enjoy the same level of importance nuclear power had after the Fukushima Daiichi Disaster. The weighted average of nuclear power’s ranking immediately after the disaster was 4.130 (on a scale of 1 to 5, 5 being the most important).

The top current issue, international relations, only received 2.543 with the economy and constitutional reform very close seconds [see Appendix B]. This might explain how it is possible the anti-nuclear movement has largely died down even as opinions have remained constant. Now that it is no longer the top political issue, there is less of a community in the anti-nuclear movement.

Demonstrating the sharp spike and subsequent decline in interest in nuclear power is the history of the 10 million People's Petition to say Goodbye to Nuclear Power Plants. The group was founded in part by Nobel laureate Oe Kenzaburo immediately after Fukushima. The group submitted its first 1.8 million signatures on June 12, 2012 (“Anti-nuclear petition”). That same day the group announced a total of 7,481,352 signatures by citizens (“Anti-nuclear petition”). The fact the petition gained so many signatories over such a short time span demonstrates just how passionately the public at large felt about nuclear power at the time. However, as of October 7, 2015 the number has only grown to 8,530,462 signatories (Sayonara Genpatsu). It seems unlikely the group will succeed in their 10 million signatures goal given this sharp decline in interest. This decline also displays clearly how attention has been focused away from nuclear power in recent years.

Therefore it appears there are be two key time frames for the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement, 2011 to 2012 and 2013 on. This is important to understanding the climate in which the anti-nuclear movement was strongest compared to today. Only when the public was united as a group against nuclear power was activism high.

One of the driving cultural components of Japan is an understood dichotomy between personal feelings, *honne* (本音) and opinions expressed in public, *tatemae* (建前) (*The Japanese Mind* 117). There is no hypocrisy viewed in holding different private

opinions than what is displayed in public (*Japanese Mind* 117). Personal views are hidden “in the interests of group harmony” and should not be shown if they “conflict with the opinions of others” (*The Japanese Mind* 117). This dichotomy of personal and public thought relates to what has been observed in the anti-nuclear movement in two ways. First, the differentiation between public and private does much to explain the apparent disconnect between public opinion and political action in Japan. When it is not seen as out of the ordinary to conceal personal opinions, it logically follows that acting on these opinions would be uncomfortable at best. Therefore the connection between opposition in opinion and opposition in action may be weaker in Japan than elsewhere. Second, the relationship of *honne* and *tatemae* is important for determining why public opposition was possible for a few years following the disaster but was incredibly difficult to maintain. According to *honne* and *tatemae*, private opinions are concealed because they are viewed as being a cause of disunity. Therefore, in order for political activism to occur on a large scale, a significant portion of the population must be willing to participate. It is only when large numbers of people are involved that openly expressing opposition can be viewed as participating with the group rather than going against the group. While this can happen, as was seen in the anti-nuclear movement, keeping such large sections of the population engaged is a tall order. This is especially true given how Japanese culture is not disposed to act out<sup>1</sup> based on private feelings. What this means for the anti-nuclear movement’s progression is that when nuclear power was the political focus of most Japanese citizens and opposition was high, more activism could occur than would

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<sup>1</sup> Though beyond the scope of this paper, it is also worth noting that if it is true that political participation in Japan is more likely through a group, then there may be ways of increasing political participation through strengthening political groups.

normally be expected. However, it was unlikely the movement could continue as less zealous individuals began to withdraw.

What was interesting about my survey results was the overwhelming lack of political activism at any time period on any topic. When asked if they participated in any of the usual forms of political activism from a list, [see Appendix A], eighty to one-hundred percent of respondents reported not participating across all age groups and types of activities. The options given to respondents translated to English were: “Went to submit a petition to the Diet or other government office,” “protested,” “signed a petition,” “participated in a demonstration,” and “other.”

The survey’s results imply that the spike in political activism brought on by the events in Fukushima was not as widespread as macro-level analysis would suggest. Given the limitations of my survey this result is inconclusive. It does however match the observations of some that the anti-nuclear protests in 2011 and 2012 were still small by international standards. These observations on the relative scale of the anti-nuclear movement support my hypothesis that the anti-nuclear movement lacked the sense of urgency for action that could have led to a drastic political revolution. Given the level of inactivity shown by my respondents overall, it is also clear that what activism did take place is all the more relevant in how it contrasts to normal political behavior.

Additionally, my survey results showed no marked increase in political action concerning nuclear power in 2011 and 2012 when compared to more recent years. Against what would be suggested by the progression of the anti-nuclear movement, there were only two more respondents who participated in nuclear power related political activities in 2011 to 2012 but not 2013 to the present. Additionally, only one respondent

reported participating in nuclear-power related activism but not any other form of activism. This suggests that those who did answer positively to the questions concerning political activism are already civically engaged individuals accustomed to political participation. This means that the Fukushima Disaster likely only directed their activism as opposed to igniting it. Again, care should be taken in applying this hypothesis to the larger population, however such an observation could help explain why the anti-nuclear movement failed to reach its larger goals.

While it would be uncommon in any culture for the majority of a population to seriously undertake political action, even when there is vehement disagreement, the lack of participation in Japan according to my results is still noteworthy. For example, while one might not expect the average citizen to go to great lengths to join protests or directly confront an elected official; non-direct forms of opposition such as petitions are usually readily available and easy to do. Despite the ease of petitions, in my survey, only six of the forty-six respondents reported to having signed a petition, and only four of them signed a petition related to nuclear power. These low numbers are especially stark in the 2011 to 2012 time period where respondents placed a high importance on nuclear power. This lends support to the claim that within Japan private opposition does not carry over into public political action. The limited success of the 10 million People's Petition to say Goodbye to Nuclear Power Plants further supports the conclusion that even petitions struggle to gather the support they need to be enacted within Japan.

That being said, petitions were still the most common form of political activism for respondents through all time periods. It was also the most common, or tied for the most common, across all age groups, except for those over twenty-five since 2013, where

a greater percentage of respondents marked “other.” However, as a single form of activism signing petitions was still the most common activity. The greater anti-nuclear movement had a similar emphasis on the use of petitions.

Petitions were a common tool in the wider anti-nuclear movement. The 10 million People’s Petition to Say Goodbye to Nuclear Power has already been addressed. Another major petition was started within the year after the accident by a group calling itself the Citizen’s Vote to Decide Together on Nuclear Power (Samuels 132). This petition’s goal was to create a referendum in urban Japan on nuclear power (Samuels 132). The group gathered the requisite number of signatures and subsequently submitted their petition in January of 2012 in Osaka and in May in Tokyo (Samuels 133). Both the mayor of Osaka, Hashimoto Tōru, and the mayor of Tokyo, Ishihara Shintarō, rejected the request for referendum and the movement died (Samuels 133). Thus it can be seen that only enough support to create the petition could be generated. The movement lacked the needed backing to push the petition through.

There is a possible cultural reason for this lack of follow-through. Petitions are one of the least direct forms of opposition possible (outside of voting). Within this context it seems that part of the reason the push for the Citizen’s Vote to Decide Together on Nuclear Power’s petition stopped after the mayors’ rejections, is to continue past that point would require direct confrontation. The shift from petition to direct conflict proved an adequate barrier to stopping the petition. To demonstrate how this is in line with the greater Japanese culture, the ways in which opposition is usually treated must be examined.

Reluctance for direct confrontation is an inherent part of Japanese culture. Joy Maynard notes while describing Japanese communication styles, that although flat refusal of invitation are awkward everywhere, the Japanese method of inviting purposefully allows the invitee the chance to refuse (139-140). Rather than attempt to “sweeten the deal” as many Americans do when a refusal to an invitation is possible, many Japanese will instead leave a way out for the invitee to decline (Maynard 139-140). The invitee is expected to subtly take these ways out rather than risk causing friction. For example, an accepted means of declining an invitation taught to first year students of Japanese is to respond simply with the word for “a little,” *chotto* (ちよつと). The closest equivalent English utilizes is “well...” but *chotto* is used much more frequently (*The Japanese Mind* 11). This can be a source of friction between the Japanese and outsiders when the declination is viewed as too indirect as to be understood clearly (*The Japanese Mind* 11).

Maynard also notes that, while arguments amongst inside group members are fairly common, conflict with outsiders is discouraged (157). Maynard describes the perception that Japanese people never disagree as a myth, but notes “Even the Japanese might have bought into the myth of harmony – good Japanese should not and do not quarrel in public” (157). With such a strong reluctance to oppose in everyday interactions, it is not a far stretch to say a reluctance to protest may stem from similar cultural norms. This would also account for a preference for petition. However, the ease of petitions makes them universally a popular form of political opposition around the world. Where support for petition being valued for indirectness is more visible is when the Citizen’s Vote to Decide Together on Nuclear Power group did not or could not apply additional

pressure on the local governments to accept the petition. The indirectness of position was not met by directness in other means.

In Japan petitioning also demonstrates another aspect of Japanese culture. In 2008 Patricia Steinhoff observed a series of three protests in front of the Japanese Defense Ministry over the course of two days (209). Through her observations she discovered what she describes as the “petition ritual” (209). At each of the three protests the leader of the protest would approach with a group of fellow organizers a government official who had come to meet them (210). Each of the organizers would read prepared statements of one to two pages then present the petition to the government official who would accept it in the traditional way of a slight bow (210). Once the formal submission was completed both protestor and bureaucrat would bow to each other (210). While this ritual accomplished the immediate goal of submitting a request to the government, Steinhoff notes that the bureaucrat sent to collect the petition was usually a junior staff member (210). Additionally, Steinhoff makes the following analysis:

The protestors would have liked to bring about real change, but they did not expect it. Deeply protective of the constitution that enabled their very existence, they found satisfaction in exercising their rights and expressing their views to a representative of the state (212).

If this is an accurate summary of those who were submitting the petition, it suggests an aspect of Japanese culture which is very important to this paper’s analysis. What Steinhoff is describing is an instance where while opinion is being expressed, no real

change is expected. If this proves to be a theme throughout Japanese culture, the absence of radical political activism despite high disapproval levels for nuclear power may begin to make more sense. This would be an interesting and informative area to explore in further research. For the time, it is sufficient to draw from this example that Japanese cultural norms are very much a guiding factor in how political activism takes shape. More importantly, rituals and politeness appears to take precedence over effectiveness.

Another way in which the anti-nuclear movement reflects a general low-level of interest in political activism is the way in which it progressed. Anti-nuclear protests began soon after the disaster. However, initial outrage was strongest in those communities directly affected. For example, less than two months after the nuclear meltdown Fukushima, parents angered by a 2000 percent increase in the maximum allowable radiation for children dumped playground sand on the desks of education officials and presented a bag of sand to the upper house of the Diet (“Fukushima Parents”). Established anti-nuclear and environmentalist groups were also among the first to actively oppose nuclear power. Around the same time the parents of Fukushima were protesting increased radiation regulations, a group of environmental activists presented a petition to the Nuclear Safety Commission (“Fukushima Parents”). A few months before, on June 11, 2011 civil society groups were able to host a network of protests throughout the country where an estimated 79,000 participated (Kawata, Pekkanen, and Tsujinaka 82). When considering the wide area involved, the numbers at these June protests were overall not substantial, but this was still a major achievement for a sector which has stayed relatively small, localized, and weak in Japan (Kawata, Pekkanen, and Tsujinaka 79-80).

Despite the highly visible events, at first the general public of Japan seemed to be less outraged and more concerned (Samuels 132). These early protests were dispersed, and compared to protests in other parts of the world, fairly small. The earliest marked change occurred in the huge influx of volunteers to the region (Kawata, Pekkanen, and Tsujinaka 88). The theme of early reactions was rebuilding, not taking on the government. It should not be forgotten that the Tōhoku disaster was three-pronged. The earthquake and tsunami killed thousands and destroyed whole towns. It is therefore only logical that rebuilding from the natural disaster would take precedence over any political movement. Subsequently, for the first year after the incident protests were relatively small and the numbers involved continued to decline (Samuels 132). Also discouraging early activism was the active stance Prime Minister Kan against nuclear power after the Fukushima Disaster (Kingston “The Politics of Disaster” 189). However, clear, opposition to nuclear power from the top official was replaced by a return to nuclear power with Kan’s successor, Prime Minister Noda (Kingston “Mismanaging Risk” 43).

It is always those most directly affected who will be the most active in terms of political protest, however this difference may be magnified in Japan by a culture built around inner groups with defined outsiders. One of the single most prevalent components to Japanese culture is the idea of *soto/uchi* 外・内 or “outside/inside” (*The Japanese Mind* 217). Many aspects of Japanese culture and social interactions hinge on the assumption of belonging to a group with established “outsiders.” Examples can be seen everywhere. The inside culture within companies, the prevalence of Tokyo University alum throughout politics and major businesses, and a reluctance to allow immigration are just a few examples of how the idea of belonging versus not belonging is permeated

throughout Japanese life. It has been noted that “Japanese in groups are usually indifferent to outsiders” (*The Japanese Mind* 196). This implies that when political issues are seen as affecting an outside group, they may be of little concern to individuals. Part of what made the nuclear industry so large and powerful was a purposeful targeting of development to small rural communities outside the bulk of the population in urban areas (Kingston “Mismanaging Risk” 44). These communities were often aging and economically depressed (Duus 183). The high subsidies and other incentives offered by the government were therefore welcome (Kingston “The Politics of Disaster” 192). To the *uchi* of rural communities, nuclear power was beneficial. To the *soto* of urban populations nuclear power was largely irrelevant (Kingston “Mismanaging Risk” 44). The first to protest were those communities who suddenly discovered they were not as safe as they had thought previously. For urban populations, nuclear power was not something prevalent on their minds and there was a much greater need for assistance in rebuilding. Later it was revealed the disaster could have been mitigated if not for widespread and deeply ingrained societal and political problems. With these revelations and the immediate crisis past, nuclear power turned from being of concern for the *soto* of rural communities to the concern of the whole *uchi* of Japan. Now urban populations had “skin in the game” and began to join the protests. Nuclear power had to be seen as a threat to the inner community for it to be propelled to a major political issue.

Anti-nuclear protests grew in 2012 for two reasons. First, it became increasingly clear as the investigation into the Fukushima Accident continued that much of the damage might have been preventable (Kingston “Mismanaging Risk”). Second, the decision was made to restart the Ōi reactors in the Kansai region (Fackler). Both of these

events pushed nuclear power back into the spotlight, and the exposed corruption turned the event from one of localized security to national politics.

As time passed more information emerged about the meltdowns and the questionable safety practices of the Fukushima Daiichi plant's owner the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) and regulators who "demonstrated an unseemly tolerance for best case scenarios" (Kingston "Tone-deaf Abe"). These revelations spread the anti-nuclear movement to the general public. Fukushima had all the correct ingredients for making nuclear power a huge political issue. According to M. Kent Jennings' research into political responses to pain and loss in the late 1990s, stories involving death and injury almost always dominated the news stories covered within the United States and generate the most action when there is a clear target for blame (1,5). Revelations about the practices of TEPCO and the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Industry (NISA) created a very clear villain in the Fukushima Daiichi narrative. Additionally Jennings found that as would be expected, political action is greatest after tragedies when the government is seen as either an actor, or as an absent overseer (5). Government officials, NISA and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) were all seen as downplaying the risks of nuclear power in order to push through policy agendas as well as allowing friends within the nuclear power industry to set their own rules. To the public the government was as much fault, if not more at fault than the nuclear power companies. Therefore if Jennings assessments are true across various cultures, then it can be seen the Fukushima Daiichi plant's disaster had all the making of leading to larger-than-usual political activism. In other words, it makes sense that the anti-nuclear movement should stand out as an exception in the general political landscape.

The largest of the early anti-nuclear power protests took place on September 19, 2011 when roughly 60,000 gathered at Meiji Park in Tokyo (Kingston “The Politics of Dealing with Disaster” 204). After this event the number at protests declined (Samuels 132). However, the restart of the Ōi reactors in the summer of 2012 proved to be the catalyst for further activism (Samuels 134). In the summer of 2012 the growing opposition for nuclear power accumulated in the largest protests to happen in central Tokyo since the 1960s (Kingston “Mismanaging Risk” 43). For a brief span of time, normal practices were ignored and protests and activism became common. News’ estimates at the time for the number of protesters at the June 29, 2012 demonstration outside the Prime Minister’s residence were between 20,000 and 45,000 (Fackler). These numbers are much smaller than those of the 1960s, but still are significant in their deviation from the norm.

Even at this critical point in the anti-nuclear movement, protestors did not pull away from politeness. Just as was observed in the “petition ritual” these protests remained in the boundaries of common Japanese decency. *New York Times* journalist Martin Fackler noted at the June 29<sup>th</sup> protest, courtesies such as keeping walkways open to pedestrians, clearing up trash, and leaving promptly at the end of the demonstration were followed. Samuels described the protest as “an orderly line more than a kilometer long” (134). While the concept of an orderly protest may seem odd at first, it is no surprise under further scrutiny given the emphasis placed on politeness and community in Japanese society.

When such a large scale protest based off of extreme anger and frustration still intentionally does not interrupt daily life, it becomes clear as to why such demonstrations

are rare in Japan. The very concept of protest in Japan is largely counter-cultural. After confining political activism to the rules of Japanese politeness, it becomes hard to imagine many instances where large portions of the population would be motivated to “create such a crisis and foster such a tension that a community which has constantly refused to negotiate is forced to confront the issue” such as those tactics used Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and other civil rights leaders in the United States (King). Cultural norms dictating behavior percolates to all areas of Japanese life, affecting not only what behaviors citizens will involve in, but how they will participate as well. Countering these practices involves a much greater sense of urgency than in cultures where protests are more readily accepted. This is an important consideration when analyzing the level of political activism in Japan.

Though there are notable exceptions throughout history, (including environmental protests in the 1960s) protests of any kind are largely absent from Japanese culture (Avenell 246). These historical instances were during highly tumultuous times and in some cases when civil groups were comparatively more active worldwide. This lack of historical protests demonstrates an unwillingness to either participate in the political process or cause disruptions. There is an additional component that protests have rarely, if ever, *worked* in Japan which would seem to discourage the protest culture present in much of Europe. This particular aspect concerns the Japanese government’s view of the public rather than the public’s view on politics however, and will therefore not be examined in detail in this paper. Therefore, we will focus on the citizen-centered reasons for this aversion to protests, namely the cultural components.

One of the most cited Japanese proverbs used when explaining Japanese culture to foreigners is “*Deru kui wa utareru.*” 「出る杭は打たれる。」 or “The nail that stands up will be pounded down.” It is a deeply ingrained trait of Japanese culture to blend in with the group and not draw attention to one’s self. This of course is directly related to the concerns with collectivism already addressed. It also is important for understanding the great emphasis placed on politeness in Japanese culture. “Japan is a society in which conciliatory, cooperative attitudes are more highly valued than strong, unyielding insistence” (*The Japanese Mind* 195). This can apply to protests as well. At its core, Japanese culture rejects strong resistance which causes disruptions to the group. Japanese citizens are taught how to work within the group and create harmony rather than emphasizing strong individual will and assertiveness. It is incredibly difficult as an everyday citizen to counter those in power such as the central government through protest when “strong, unyielding insistence” is disvalued. Again, this analysis is generally applied at the individual level rather than the group, but it does not make sense that individuals would act outside their comfort area in politics any more than they would in private life. This resistance explains how an absence of strong political activism in Japan does not necessarily equate to an absence of interest in politics. For the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement, the forces pushing towards greater activism were countered by ingrained culture. The result was a period of wide-spread, yet restrained, activism which quickly diminished.

As 2012 drew to a close and 2013 began, protests continued, but with a notable loss of steam. In October of 2013 a rally almost equal in size to that held in June of 2012 was hosted by a coalition of anti-nuclear organizations in Hibiya Park in Tokyo (“Tens of

thousands”). These protests were in response to a governmental push for restarts of nuclear plants (“Tens of thousands”). However, even the organizers of this protest realized the window of opportunity for change was closing. According to an *Asahi Shimbun* article one of the organizers and Nobel laureate, Oe Kenzaburo, expressed concern that “If an opportunity to restart the nuclear reactors is given at some point in six months or a year, it will be impossible to push back the momentum to the restarting of the nuclear power plants (“Tens of thousands”). This protest was a last attempt to stop the gears of government from returning to “business as usual,” but as can be seen in the recent restarts, the anti-nuclear movement proved unsuccessful in its overall goal of ending the use of nuclear power. The unique mix of attention, outrage, and disapproval slowly dissolved as emotions calmed down. At least in this particular case, societal expectations reverted to the dominant force.

The first reactor since the Ōi reactors were shut down in 2013 for repairs was restarted in August when the Kyushu Nuclear Power Company turned on its first reactor at its Sendai plant (France-Presse). The initial restart in August was met with protests outside the Prime Minister’s residence by roughly 1,000 people, but when the second reactor was restarted in October, only around 100 protesters came to the site in opposition (Diggs). Compared to protests after the restarting of the Ōi reactors, it is clear that the Japanese public has largely moved on from the issue of nuclear power. It is no longer considered worth disrupting the daily flow of life in order to force more changes to nuclear power on top of the new stringent safety regulations.

### Conclusion (結論)

In his analysis of the effects crises can have on national politics, Samuels makes the following statement:

But if the window of opportunity for change - the highly emotional moment - is not seized by attentive political entrepreneurs and social engineers, it may close prematurely. Political fervor may recede, and briefly relaxed constraints may recongeal; the most acute phases of this crisis will pass with little lasting effect. (26).

Now nearing five years after the Fukushima disaster, it appears that the results Samuels describes have come to fruition. The highly emotional time when cultural norms were rejected in favor of strong activism has passed. In a recent article for CNN, Jeff Kingston writes “The nuclear village has survived the perfect storm and energy policy is settling back in” (“Tone-deaf”). There is little chance of major push-back now at least on the issue of nuclear power, because the “perfect storm” which disrupted social norms has passed, making further counter-cultural actions unlikely.

Given the cultural norms and the observed macro-level trends in the anti-nuclear movement, the findings of my questionnaire are likely true over a large cross-section of the Japanese populace. However, in order to support my thesis further, future studies should be conducted with larger and more balanced samples. Additional information may be gathered by focusing on specific demographics as well, including young adults, the elderly, and women.

Additionally, since the summer of 2015 other political issues have been eclipsed by the controversy surrounding recent reinterpretations of the Japanese constitution. Abe and his government pushed through unpopular legislation which reinterprets the Japanese Constitution to allow for the Japanese Self-Defense Force to participate in overseas operations for the first time since the end of World War II (Hakim). The controversy is especially significant in the large number of young adults who are involved (Hakim). Future studies on the political activism surrounding this change will be important for the study of Japanese cultural studies.

In conclusion, the events surrounding the anti-nuclear movement in Japan after the Fukushima Daiichi Disaster offers a lens through which to view Japanese culture concerning politics. The brevity of active opposition was not a result of a lack of opinion or caring in nuclear power. Rather, the opposition that did occur should be viewed as all the more significant in it occurred despite a culture fundamentally disposed to avoid direct opposition. It should also be noted that the anti-nuclear movement won important concessions in much higher safety regulations and a scaling back of nuclear power goals from their pre-2011 levels. From the results of my survey, it can be concluded that at least for a time, nuclear power was the number one political issue in Japan. Nuclear power has faced large public opposition at remarkably consistent levels from 2011 to today. Despite this, political activism remained uncommon outside of those who are already politically involved, and those activities which did occur, favored less direct and disruptive methods. Using cultural analysis, it can be seen that the group-centered culture of Japan creates an environment which makes sustained opposition incredibly difficult.

Therefore, assessments of political investment in Japan should be careful to consider all of these facets of Japanese culture before reaching conclusions.

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## Appendix A

### Full Questionnaire

#### 全部アンケート

#### 原発についての意見

私は日本語を勉強しているアメリカ人の大学生です。私の卒業論文のために日本人の原発についての意見を研究しています。このアンケートは匿名です。時間があれば、していただけませんか。たくさんの方の意見がほしいので、友達や同僚にも送っていただけませんか。

- I. 個人の情報
  - a. 性別
    - 男
    - 女
  - b. 年齢
    - 16～25 歳
    - 26～30 歳
    - 31～40 歳
    - 41～50 歳
    - 51～60 歳
    - 61+歳
  - c. お住まいの都道府県

あなたの意見を教えてください。

- II. 日本は原発を使ったほうが良いと思いますか。
  - はい
  - いいえ
  - わからない
- III. 下記の色々な政治問題の中で、どれが重要だと思いますか。ランキングしてください。
  - a. 1 番目  
[リスト Dropdown list]
    - 原発
    - TPP
    - 経済

- 憲法
- 医療
- 国会
- 環境
- 国際関係
- 雇用
- 女性差別
- その他

「その他」を選んだら、詳細を書いてください。:

b. 2 番目

[リスト Dropdown list]

- 上記 See above

c. 3 番目

[リスト Dropdown list]

- 上記 See above

d. 4 番目

[リスト Dropdown list]

- 上記 See above

e. 5 番目

[リスト Dropdown list]

- 上記 See above

IV. 福島第一原子力電所事故が発生した当時、下記の色々な政治問題の中で、どれが重要だったと思いますか。ランキングしてください。

a. 1 番目

[リスト Dropdown list]

- 上記 See above

b. 2 番目

[リスト Dropdown list]

- 上記 See above

c. 3 番目

[リスト Dropdown list]

- 上記 See above

d. 4 番目

[リスト Dropdown list]

- 上記 See above

e. 5 番目

[リスト Dropdown list]

○上記 See above

- V. 下記の行動のうち、2011年から現在に至るまで、（原発以外のことについて）行ったことを教えてください。

	該当する	該当しない	分からない
議会や役所に請願や陳情に行った			
抗議をした			
請願書に署名した			
デモに参加した			
その他			

「その他」を選んだら、詳細を書いてください。：

- VI. 下記の行動のうち、あなたが原発事故発生時から2012年までの間に（原発について）行ったことを教えてください。

	該当する	該当しない	分からない
議会や役所に請願や陳情に行った			
抗議をした			
請願書に署名した			
デモに参加した			
その他			

「その他」を選んだら、詳細を書いてください。：

- VII. 下記の行動のうち、あなたが2013年から今年までの間に（原発について）行ったことを教えてください。

	該当する	該当しない	分からない
議会や役所に請願や陳情に行った			
抗議をした			
請願書に署名した			
デモに参加した			
その他			

「その他」を選んだら、詳細を書いてください。：

## Appendix B

### Political Issues Ranking

#### 政治問題のランキング

Overall Ranking ランキング	Political Issue 政治の問題	Average Points ポイントの平均
1	国際関係 (international relations)	2.543
2	経済 (economy)	2.370
3	憲法 (constitution)	2.304
4	原発 (nuclear energy)	1.565
5	国会 (Diet)	1.413
6	雇用 (employment)	1.370
7	医療 (health care)	1.065
8	環境 (environment)	0.761
9	女性差別 (discrimination against women)	0.565
10	TPP (Trans Pacific Partnership)	0.522
11	その他 (other)	0.522

Overall Ranking ランキング	Political Issue 政治の問題	Average Points ポイントの平均
1	原発 (nuclear energy)	4.130
2	環境 (environment)	2.652
3	経済 (economy)	1.957
4	国会 (Diet)	1.652
5	国際関係 (international relations)	1.152
6	医療 (health care)	1.130
7	TPP (Trans Pacific Partnership)	0.130
8	雇用 (employment)	0.761
9	憲法 (constitution)	0.739
10	その他 (other)	0.522
11	女性差別 (discrimination against women)	0.109

## Appendix B

### “Other” Results

#### 「その他」の結果


Table 1.3: “Other” Explanations – Current 「その他」の説明－現代	
1 番目 (1 <sup>st</sup> )	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● 難民 (refugees)</li> <li>● 安保関連法案 (US-Japan Security Treaty)</li> <li>● 社会保障 (social security)</li> <li>● 少子化 (declining birth rate)</li> </ul>
2 番目 (2 <sup>nd</sup> )	
3 番目 (3 <sup>rd</sup> )	
4 番目 (4 <sup>th</sup> )	
5 番目 (5 <sup>th</sup> )	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● 教育 (education) – 2 人 (2 people)</li> <li>● 少子化 (declining birth rate)</li> <li>● 少子高齢化 (declining birth rate and aging population)</li> </ul>

Table 1.4: “Other” Explanations – At Time of Fukushima Disaster 「その他」の説明－福島第一原子力発電所事故が発生した当時	
1 番目 (1 <sup>st</sup> )	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● 政府の住民への対応 (government-public relations)</li> <li>● 復興 (reconstruction/recovery)</li> <li>● 被災者支援 (aid for disaster victims)</li> </ul>
2 番目 (2 <sup>nd</sup> )	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● 特にブラック企業のこと (exploitation of employees by businesses)</li> <li>● 国民の認識 (civic awareness)</li> </ul>
3 番目 (3 <sup>rd</sup> )	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● 意識醸成 (growing awareness)</li> </ul>
4 番目 (4 <sup>th</sup> )	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● 少子化 (declining birth rate)</li> </ul>
5 番目 (5 <sup>th</sup> )	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● 政府の国民への原発に対する対応 (government-public divide on nuclear power)</li> <li>● 国土交通 (Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transportation)</li> </ul>

Appendix C

Respondent's Prefecture of Residency



回答者の住んでいる都道府県



## Appendix D

### Political Participation (Percent of Respondents)

政治の行動（回答者のパーセント）



## Appendix D

